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Legislating Against the Threat: The U.S. and Canadian Policy Elite 
Response to the Terrorist Threat 
Sara K. McGuire 
 
Introduction 
While it is relatively easy to determine the authorized speakers of security who first 
identify a given existential threat, it is important to determine this group’s initial target 
audience. All variants of securitization theory posit that the securitization of a given issue 
is not possible unless the audience accepts it as posing an existential threat. However, the 
notion of the audience has been left under-theorized by scholars working within this 
framework. One method of rectifying this lack of clarity concerning the audience is to 
divide this group into two separate categories: the elite audience and the populist 
audience. Following this model, the elite audience, which is comprised of members of the 
policy elite including bureaucrats and elected-officials, serves as an early indicator as to 
whether or not the securitization of a given issue area has taken place. If there is little to 
no debate amongst members of the policy elite about the immediate implementation of 
security measures and policies as well as the creation of institutions to support those 
policies, then there is a strong indication that securitization has taken place.  
 
Since the securitization of an issue cannot take place without the acceptance of the entire 
audience, it is important to carefully consider those at whom the securitizing speech acts 
of designated authorized speakers of security are aimed. Members of the elite audience 
serve as “first responders” in that they either accept that an issue poses an existential 
threat and then transmit that threat to the populist audience, or, they reject the threat and 
thus effectively cancel-out the securitization process. This paper will consider the role of 
the policy elite in the securitization process and will examine the differences between 
members of the policy elite in Canada and the United States in order to clarify the role of 
the elite audience in the securitization process.  
 
Securitization: An Overview 
Before examining the response of the Canadian and American policy elite to the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, it is necessary to provide some theoretical context. Securitization theory 
is commonly assumed to be synonymous with the work of the so-called Copenhagen 
School and its seminal text, “Security: A New Framework for Analysis.”1 This 
assumption, however, is too simplistic. In fact, there are three variants of securitization 
theory into which most scholarly works can be categorized: philosophical securitization, 
sociological securitization, and post-structural securitization. The work of the 
Copenhagen School, and its initial development of the concept of securitization as the 
“new framework for analysis” serve as the dominant articulation of this theory; however, 
this perspective is only one expression of the philosophical variant of securitization.  
 
                                                 
1
 Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998).  
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Philosophical Securitization in Theory and Practice 
For purposes of this paper, the philosophical variant of securitization theory will be used 
to assess the ways in which the United States sought to securitize its border in the post-
9/11 period. Philosophical approaches to securitization contend that the utterance of the 
term, ‘security’ is, in itself, an act that constitutes a threat as existential. This approach 
places special emphasis on the notion of speech acts as developed by John L. Austin and 
John R. Searle. Austin first articulated the concept of speech acts in his 1962 text, How to 
do Things With Words. He contends that speech acts “do” things; thus, saying something 
is doing something.2 Speech acts emphasize the process by which threats are securitized. 
Austin posited that these speech acts are conceived as forms of representation that do not 
simply depict a preference or view of an external reality.3 Instead, he proposes that, 
“many utterances are equivalent to actions; when we say certain words or phrases we also 
perform a particular action.”4 Austin further argued that the point of speech act theory 
was to challenge the assumption that, “the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to 
‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which it must do either truly or 
falsely.”5 In keeping with Austin’s theory, certain statements do more than merely 
describe a given reality and, “…as such cannot be judged as false or true. Instead these 
utterances realize a specific action; they ‘do’ things – they are ‘performatives’ as opposed 
to ‘constatives’ that simply report states of affairs and are thus subject to truth and falsity 
tests.”6 Therefore, speech act theory recognizes the ways in which language can do more 
than just convey information. Austin was especially interested in, “phrases that constitute 
a form of action or social activity in themselves.” These would include such phrases as, 
“thank you”, “I promise”, and “You are fired.”7 Scholars in the philosophical 
securitization tradition have applied Austin’s speech act framework to the use of the term, 
“security.” A more nuanced understanding of speech acts suggests that when certain 
words are used, they have the affect of prioritizing issues.  
 
Speech act theory has been co-opted by philosophical securitization theorists. Waever 
explains how Austin’s theory can be applied to security issues, noting that, “With the 
help of language theory, we can regard ‘security’ as a speech act. In this usage, security is 
not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act.”8 
Waever argues that the process of securitization is initiated by a speech act that serves as 
a “securitizing move” which marks the transformation of an issue not previously thought 
of as a security threat to a recognized security issue necessitating an exceptional 
response.9 In their seminal work, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, 
Waever, and De Wilde note that both internal and external elements must be present in 
                                                 
2
 Fierke, K.M., Critical Approaches to International Security (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 104. 
3
 See Williams, Paul, Security Studies: An Introduction. (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2008), 69 for 
further elaboration. 
4
 Quoted in: Vaughan-Williams, Nick, Columba Peoples, Critical Security Studies: An Introduction (New 
York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), 77. 
5
 Austin, John L., How to do Things With Words (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 1. 
6
 Balzacq, 175. (Need Full Citation Here) 
7
 Elbe, Stefan, Security and Global Health (New York: Polity Press, 2010), 11. 
8
 Ole Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” in Ronnie D. Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995): 55. 
9
 Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, Critical Security Studies, 78. 
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order for a speech act to be accepted by its intended audience. First, among the internal 
conditions of speech acts, “the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar 
of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a 
possible way out – the general grammar of security as such plus the particular dialects of 
the different sectors, such as talk identity in the societal sector, recognition and 
sovereignty in the political sector, … and so on.”10 
 
In contrast, the external aspect of a speech act has two main conditions. The first is the 
social capital of the enunciator, the securitizing actor, who is in a recognized position of 
authority. The second external condition relates to the actual threat. Buzan et. al. explain 
that, “it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be 
referred to that are generally held to be threatening.”11 
 
While the philosophical tradition centers on the speech acts themselves as the focus of 
securitization, the securitizing actors and audience are another important component of 
this theoretical model. Speech acts do not occur in a vacuum – they are embedded, 
“rhetorically, culturally, and institutionally in ways that make them somewhat predictable 
and not wholly open or expandable.”12 Security as speech act occurs in structured 
institutions where some actors are in positions of power by being generally accepted 
voices of security; by having power to define it. Buzan and his colleagues note that 
securitization relies upon, “existential threats, emergency action, and effects on inter-unit 
relations by breaking free of the rules. It continues to be structurally focused in existing 
authoritative structures.”13 In this respect, the philosophical approach to securitization 
seems to be premised on statist conceptions of security. This approach holds that it is 
often “the state” that initiates the securitizing speech act. Buzan and his colleagues 
explain that, in contrast to the post structural approach to security studies, the 
Copenhagen School (which is situated in the philosophical tradition), “abstain(s) from 
attempts to talk about what ‘real security’ would be for people, what are ‘actual’ security 
problems larger than those propagated by elites and the like.”14 Although typically 
classified as a “critical approach to security studies”, the philosophical variant of 
securitization theory accepts the state as a valid referent object, and ignores the 
emancipatory agenda adopted by other critical methodologies.15 While there is nothing 
explicitly prohibiting this approach from being applied to groups other than states, there 
is a notion that, “at the heart of the security concept we still find something to do with 
defense and the state.”16 
 
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies (or CS) serves as the most recognizable 
articulation of the philosophical approach to securitization. The label, “Copenhagen 
School” was given to the collective research agenda of various academics at the (now 
                                                 
10
 Buzan et. al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 33. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Hudson, Natalie Florea, Gender, Human Security and the United Nations: Security Language as a 
Political Framework for Women (New York: Taylor& Francis, 2009), 31. 
13
 Buzan et. al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 26. 
14
 Ibid, 35. 
15
 This is in contrast to the post structural approach to securitization theory, as will be discussed later. 
16
 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 47. 
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defunct) Copenhagen Peace Research Institute in Denmark. This term was applied 
specifically to the work of Buzan and Waever. The label “Copenhagen School” itself and 
its central concepts, “developed over time, less initially as a specific project for the study 
of security than as a series of interventions on different concepts and cases.”17 The CS 
agenda ultimately came to represent the fusion of two significant conceptual and 
theoretical innovations in security studies: Barry Buzan’s notion of different sectors of 
security—first articulated by Buzan in, “Peoples, States, and Fear” in 1983 and later 
updated by Buzan in1991—and Ole Waever’s conception of ‘securitization.’18 The 
collaborative work of the CS culminated in the 1998 publication of, “Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis,” by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde. This work 
became the foundational text of the Copenhagen School’s research agenda. The 
Copenhagen School can be classified as a philosophical approach to securitization theory 
because it seeks to, “emphasize that social constructions often become sedimented and 
relatively stable practices.”19 It follows that the task, in philosophical securitization 
theory, is not only to criticize this sedimentation but also to understand how the dynamics 
of security work so as to change them.  
 
The research agenda of the so-called “Copenhagen School” sought to broaden the 
concept of security; however, instead of widening the debate over what constituted a 
“security” threat, the CS sought to, “displace the terms of the dispute from security 
sectors to rationalities of security framing.”20 To this end, the CS extends the breadth of 
“security” beyond the traditional politico-military sphere to what it identifies as the five 
discrete political, economic, environmental, military, and societal sectors.21 The primary 
question addressed in “Security: A New Framework for Analysis,” is how to define what 
is and what is not a security issue in the context of a broadened understanding of security. 
Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde argue that if the security agenda is broadened, then there is 
a need for some sort of analytical grounding or principle to judge what is and what is not 
a security issue; otherwise, there is a danger that the concept of ‘security’ will become so 
broad that it covers everything and hence becomes effectively meaningless.22 The CS 
posits that “security” is primarily about survival. Thus, “Security action is usually taken 
on behalf of, and with reference to, a collectivity. The referent object is that to which one 
can point and say, ‘It has to survive, therefore it is necessary to…’.”23 Accordingly, 
whether the referent object of security is an individual, group, state, or nation, “security” 
is an ontological status, that of feeling security, which at any one time may be under 
threat from a number of different directions.  
 
                                                 
17
 Williams, Security Studies, 68. 
18
 Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, Critical Security Studies, 76; Also, see Waever 1995 for an earlier 
iteration. 
19
 Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, 102. 
20
 Huysmans, Jef, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration, and Asylum in the EU (New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 28. 
21
 For further elaboration see Donreuther, Roland, International Security: The Contemporary Agenda (New 
York: Polity, 2007), 42. 
22
 For further elaboration refer to Vaughan-Williams and Peoples, Security Studies, 76. 
23
 Buzan et. al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 36. 
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The CS employs a methodology that seems to draw heavily from the theoretical 
assumptions of constructivism. The key constructivist insight of the Copenhagen School 
is to, “shift attention away from an objectivist analysis of threat assessment to the 
multiple and complex ways in which security threats are internally generated and 
constructed.”24 In this way, the CS brings greater nuance to the constructivist argument 
that security is not an objective condition but the outcome of a specific kind of social 
process, susceptible to criticism and change. The CS research agenda denies the existence 
of any objectively given preconditions and circumstances in politics. This 
conceptualization of securitization rejects the realist assumptions that, “groups are 
formed in response to threats from the outside.”25 There is no such thing as an objective 
security concern because any public issue may be identified by the actors as political or 
non-political or as posing a threat to the community writ large. Although they criticize 
mainstream constructivism for its deliberate state-centrism, the CS remains, “firmly 
within methodological collectivism saying that not only states, but also other units such 
as nations, societies, social movements, and individuals, can act as agents in the name of 
collective referent objects.”26 The Copenhagen School’s social constructivist tendencies 
are especially evident in its distinction between the subject and object of security. 
According to the suppositions of constructivism, there is no implicit, objective, or given 
relation between the subject – the security actor – and the object of securitization. Rather 
this relation is constructed intersubjectivity through social relations and processes.27  
 
Differentiating Between the Elite and Populist Audiences 
In order for the securitization of a given issue to take place, that issue must be accepted as 
posing an existential threat to the security of the state by the audience. The importance of 
the role of the audience cannot be overstated in securitization theory. For this reason, it is 
crucial for the philosophical variant of securitization theory to offer a clear 
conceptualization of who constitutes the audience and how this group’s acceptance or 
rejection of a given threat can be assessed.28 This weakness in clearly delineating the 
composition and role of the audience in securitization theory has even been 
acknowledged by the theory’s founder, Ole Waever, who recognized that the concept of 
‘audience,’ “… needs a better definition and probably differentiation.”29 Previous 
scholarly attempts to assess the philosophical variant of securitization theory have 
remained vague about the composition of the audience. It is not clear what the acceptance 
by the audience means and entails exactly, and, therefore, how this acceptance or 
rejection of a given threat could be identified in practice.  
                                                 
24
 Donnreuther, International Security, 42. 
25
 Kolsto, Pal, Media Discourse and the Yugoslav Conflicts: Representations of the Self and Other (New 
York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009), 10. 
26
 Aalto, Pami, Constructing Post-Soviet Geopolitics in Estonia (New York: Routledge, 2003), 44. 
27
 Buzan et. al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 30 – 31; Gobbicchi, Alessandro, Globalization, 
Armed Conflict and Security (Rubbettino Editoe, 2004), 212. 
28
 For further discussion of the importance of better articulating the role of the audience refer to: Sarah 
Leonard and Christian Kaunert, “Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory,” In Thierry 
Balzacq, ed. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve (New York: Routledge, 
2011): 57 – 62. 
29
 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 26; While Waever recognized the need to clarify the role 
of the audience, his work does not offer suggestions for better defining this concept.  
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In order to utilize the philosophical variant of securitization theory as a means of 
assessing the policy response of a state to a given threat, it is necessary to address some 
of the challenges pertaining to the role of the audience that are inherent in this theoretical 
construct. Scholars agree that there is a need to clearly delineate the role of the audience 
in securitization theory. One-way of addressing this lack of clarity is to view the audience 
as comprising two separate groups: the elite audience, and the populist audience. The 
elite audience is comprised of policy elites such as elected officials and bureaucrats as 
well as the media.30 This faction of the audience must accept or reject an existential threat 
articulated by an authorized speaker of security. If the elite audience accepts that there is 
an immediate threat to the state, then this group enacts policy decisions and creates 
institutions to combat that threat. In addition, it informs the public of the imminent 
danger. The populist audience, comprised of the voting public of a given state, must then 
accept or reject the threat being promulgated by the elite audience.  
 
Members of the Policy Elite as Elite Audience Members 
According to the Copenhagen School, members of the policy elite, which includes 
bureaucrats and elected state officials, comprise half of the elite audience. The 
Copenhagen School explains that, in the case of issues affecting national security, this 
policy elite audience, “influence(s) the dynamics of the sector without being either 
referent objects or securitizing actors.”31 This audience group is important since, “… 
subunits within the state are of interest in military security terms either because of an 
ability to shape the military or foreign policy of the state or because they have the 
capability to take autonomous action.”32 In other words, the policy elite is tasked with 
implementing measures aimed at countering a given threat that has been articulated by 
the authorized speakers of security. If the policy elite accept that a given issue poses an 
imminent threat, then they, “… have the ability to influence the making of military and 
foreign policy; this is the familiar world of bureaucratic politics.”33 This bureaucratic 
process is the first step on the continuum of acceptance or rejection of a given threat by 
the wider audience.  
 
The first stage of acceptance (or rejection) of an existential threat takes place within a 
bureaucratic field in which many agencies, ministries, or actors are all seeking executive 
attention, public imagination, and public funding. Members of the policy elite operate 
within prescribed frameworks. For example, elected officials must operate within the 
boundaries prescribed by their elected positions, while bureaucrats must operate within 
the limits of their departmental mandates. The policy elite can be likened to Max Weber’s 
conception of social administration, which he proposed, “… was a product of the 
rationalization process – procedural, bureaucratic means to carry out rules of legitimacy 
and legal authority.”34  
                                                 
30
 The next chapter will examine the role of the media as a component of the elite audience.  
31
 Buzan et. al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 56.  
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. 
34
 Quoted in Kevin Walby and Sean P. Hier. “Risk Technologies and the Securitization of Post-9/11 
Citizenship: The Case of National ID Cards in Canada,” Working Paper. 
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Defining the Policy Elite 
Building on definitions of the “public policy elite” proposed by Lomax Cook and 
Skogstad, for the purposes of this analysis, the term, “policy elite” can be defined as 
consisting of two groups. One is the political elite, such as elected officials at the 
national, state, and local levels. The other group is made up of administrative officers and 
employees of the national and provincial governments and superintendents in government 
offices.35 This group comprises decision-makers are who considered to have a high-level 
of expertise in specific issue-areas and, as a result of this expertise, often have privileged 
access to others concerned with the same issue areas. As a result of their positions, 
members of the policy elite concerned with a specific area of responsibility (as for 
example, public health) would be able to contact and meet the top executives of 
multinational companies concerned with this area (such as Bayer) or with high-ranking 
members of an international agency (such as the WHO).36 This group gains its expertise 
in a variety of ways: by working their way up in the public bureaucracy within a specific 
ministry, gaining experience in private corporations, as university researchers, in labor 
unions, in law firms, and in many other places.37 The common characteristic for all 
members of the policy elite is that they are involved in either making or implementing 
policies either in government or private organizations at the top levels. 
 
While members of the policy elite possess a high level of expertise in specific issue areas, 
they do not form a “ruling class” that can be viewed as a cohesive structure. Dahl notes 
that, “Like intellectuals generally, policy elites are a diverse lot.”38 This is to say that 
policy elites do not all share a unified agenda. They do not all think alike, or move in 
lockstep to advance a collective outcome. Birkland explains that these elites are not static 
entities. Thus, “while the American system of government favors more powerful and 
more focused economic interests over less powerful, more diffuse interests, often the less 
powerful interests – or, disadvantaged interests – can coalesce and, when the time is 
right, find avenues for the promotion of their ideas.”39 At the same time, newly elected 
government administrations often seek to replace existing policy elites with those who 
will be more sympathetic to the governing party’s policy agenda.  
 
Theoretical Origins of the Policy Elite – Democratic Theory and Rational Choice 
As a component of the elite audience, members of the policy elite are intrinsically bound 
by a symbiotic relationship with members of the general public. The notion of a policy 
                                                 
35
 This definition borrows from wording used in the definition of “policy elite” prescribed by M. Manisha 
and Sharmila Mitra Deb, Indian Democracy: Problems and Prospects. (Anthem Press, 2009), 183; Fay 
Lomax Cook with J. Barabas and B. Page. “Invoking Public Opinion: Policy Elites and Social Security,” 
Public Opinion Quarterly 66:2 (2002); Grace Skogstad, “Policy Paradigms, Transnationalism, and 
Domestic Politics.  
36
 Buse, Kent, Nicholas Mays and Gill Walt, Making Health Policy: Second Edition (Maidenhead: Open 
University Press, McGraw-Hill Education Edition, 2012), 6-7.  
37
 For a more extensive list of where members of the policy elite gain their expertise see: Dahl, Robert A., 
Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press, 1991), 335.  
38
 Dahl. Democracy and Its Critics, 335.  
39
 Birkland, Thomas A., An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts, and Models of Public 
Policy Making – Third Edition (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2011), 168 – 169.  
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elite – a group of area-specific policy specialists – is grounded in democratic theory, 
which asserts that, “… democracy is supposed to involve policy makers paying attention 
to ordinary citizens – that is, the public.”40 Thus, while members of the policy elite are 
influenced by authorized state speakers – the executive authority within a given state - 
they are also expected to demonstrate concern for the public sentiment. Page cites studies 
suggesting that, “… ordinary citizens have tended to be considerably less enthusiastic 
than foreign-policy elites about the use of force abroad, about economic or (especially) 
military aid or arms sales, and about free trade agreements.”41 Members of the policy 
elite must be cognizant of public opinion. Since members of this group are elected by the 
people, they are held responsible for their policy decisions by the public at election time.  
 
This symbiotic relationship between members of the policy elite and the general public is 
further reinforced by rational choice theorists who suggest that, “… public officials in a 
democracy have reason to pay attention to public opinion.”42 Advocates of the rational 
choice model have long argued that vote-seeking politicians are compelled to advocate 
and enact policies favored by a majority of voters.43 Black explains that, “If citizens’ 
preferences are ‘jointly single peaked’ (i.e. uni-dimensional), the median voter theorem 
indicates that politicians’ rhetoric and policies should exactly reflect the preferences of 
the average voter.”44  
 
This reciprocal relationship between members of the voting public and members of the 
policy elite has important implications regarding the securitization of a given policy issue 
area. There is substantial scholarly evidence of rather close connections between citizens’ 
preferences and public policies. These studies have found a significant correspondence 
between national policies and majority opinion at one moment in time45, between policies 
in several states and the liberalism or conservatism of public opinion in those states46, and 
between changes over time in public opinion and public policy47. While members of the 
policy elite must either accept or reject a securitizing move made by the authorized 
speakers of security (often the executive power within a state), this group must also 
gauge whether or not the public has accepted or rejected the initiation of a securitizing 
move. For example, while the executive power of the state can make speeches alerting 
                                                 
40
 Cook et. al, “Invoking Public Opinion, 236.  
41
 Page, Benjamin I., Who Deliberates? Mass Media in Modern Democracy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 118. 
42
 Cook et. al, “Invoking Public Opinion, 237.  
43
 Otto A. Davis and Melvin Hinich, “A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic 
Society.” In Joseph L. Bernd, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science (Dallas: Southern 
Methodist University Press, 1966): 175 – 205. 
44
 Black, Duncan, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1958), Chapter Four. 
45
 Alan D. Munroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980 – 1993,” Public Opinion Quarterly 62:1 
(1998): 6 – 28.  
46
 Erikson, Robert S., Gerald C. Wright, and John P. McIver, Statehouse Democracy: Public Opinion and 
Policy in the American States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
47
 Christopher Wlezien, “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending,” American 
Journal of Political Science 39:4 (1995): 981 – 1000; Larry M. Bartels, “Constituency Opinion and 
Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Buildup,” American Political Science Review Vol. 85 
(1991): 457 – 474.  
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the public to the threat of an imminent attack, if the public does not accept that there is an 
existential danger to the state, then the policy elite will have to consider both the claims 
made by the authorized speakers of security and the beliefs of the public before 
generating a response. Since the securitization of a given issue area is contingent on the 
acceptance or rejection of a given threat by the entire audience, it is sometimes the case 
that the elite audience is influenced by the acceptance or rejection of a threat by the 
populist audience. Thus, if the populist audience rejects an authorized speaker’s 
articulation of imminent danger, then the elite audience will not implement measures that 
would reinforce the securitization of the issue. Ultimately, the two audience groups (elite 
and populist) form a sort of feedback loop with one group affecting the acceptance or 
rejection of the threat by the other audience group.  
 
How do Members of the Policy Elite Advance or Reject the Securitization Process? 
As a component of the elite audience, the relationship between the policy elite of a given 
state and the general public is relevant to the role the former plays in either advancing or 
rejecting the securitizing move initiated by the authorized speakers of security. The 
Copenhagen School suggests that the role played by the elite audience in the 
securitization process is somewhat minimized in the case of persistent security threats 
that have become institutionalized. In these cases, “… urgency has been established by 
the previous use of the security move. There is no further need to spell out that this issue 
has to take precedence.”48 This does not mean that issues already recognized as threats to 
the state are not securitized, on the contrary, these issues were most likely first 
established through a securitizing move, and are often continuously justified through the 
discourse of security.49 The Copenhagen School uses the example of dykes in the 
Netherlands – there is already an established sense of urgency concerning the potential 
for catastrophic floods in that state; therefore, members of the policy elite do not need to 
be persuaded by authorized speakers of security to enact measures to protect the state’s 
system of dykes – the need for immediate action has already been recognized. It follows 
that, when the existence of an existential threat has been legitimized within the state by 
security rhetoric, “… it becomes institutionalized as a package legitimization, and it is 
thus possible to have black security boxes in the political process.”50 Therefore, the 
policy elite are likely to respond quickly to developments related to a threat that has 
already been articulated by the authorized speakers and accepted by the state audience.  
 
Following the acceptance of an issue as posing an imminent security threat, members of 
the policy elite advance the securitization process by implementing policies and creating 
institutions aimed at responding to the threat. Mabee explains that the recognition of this 
entrenchment of issue-specific securitization is important because it draws attention to 
specific threats as well as to the broader threat environment of a state. He notes that, “the 
creation of new state security institutions and their reproduction, is dependent to a certain 
extent on the existence of a discourse about their necessity and actual role.”51 The 
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institutionalization of a specific threat affects the ways in which the policy elite will 
respond to that threat. Therefore, the institutionalization of a specific threat as posing 
imminent danger to the state will, over time, result in the reification of a particular kind 
of state, which is, “… geared institutionally towards specific ways of both deciding what 
is a threat and responding to threats.”52 Threats that have been institutionalized within a 
state are subject to prescribed responses that are consistent with previous attempts to 
address those threats.  
 
Issues that have been institutionalized and are therefore accepted as warranting an 
immediate, securitized response are often automatically, “… placed beyond the realm of 
‘reasonable public scrutiny’ and given an unwarranted basis of legitimacy.”53 In these 
cases, securitization is taken for granted and the need to convince the audience of the 
validity of a threat is removed. Securitization, then, “… can be seen as an act that 
successfully fixes the definition of a situation as one encapsulated with ‘threat’, thereby 
excluding other possible constructions of meaning.”54 When a threat has been 
institutionalized, the security environment of the state and its preconceived notions of 
what constitutes an appropriate response limit the actions taken by the policy elite in 
response to that threat.  
 
The different spheres in which members of the policy elite find themselves further 
influences the response of this group to an articulated threat. The ‘acceptance’ of the 
audience and the ‘resonance’ of an existential threat is different in different spheres and is 
shaped by the different institutional bounds that constrain the actions of members of the 
policy elite. For example, Sociological securitization specialist, Salter, notes that, 
“Within the security sphere, different narratives are deployed for security threats in 
different sectors, different characters may attempt a securitizing speech act, and the 
relationship between the audience and the performer structure how those speech acts are 
made and received.”55 The actions of members of the policy elite are constrained by their 
individual roles within the bureaucracy. For example, a Finance Minister will not respond 
to the threat of foreign invasion in the same manner as a Minister of Defense. While both 
officials may accept the validity of an impending threat, their individual responses are 
bounded by the mandates of their elected positions. The restrictions of bureaucratic 
groupthink will influence the individual responses of members of the policy elite.  
 
The American Policy Elite in the Post-9/11 Period 
 The response of the American policy elite to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
provides a strong indicator that the elite audience in the United States accepted the 
securitizing move initiated by President Bush. As Robert Johnson has noted, in the 
United States, security issues are generally filtered through a political process that is 
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characterized by a lack of consensus among policy elites.56 The American congressional 
decision-making process is characterized by a diffusion of power, whereby policy 
decisions are the result of disaggregated and pluralistic opinions. Although the President 
generally has the most power with regard to agenda setting, he depends on Congress to 
appropriate funds for the measures he proposes, and Congress can block issues or push 
forward others that the President has not chosen.57 Terrorism normally appears on the 
national policy agenda as a result of highly visible and symbolic attacks on the American 
populous or American property.58 The way that members of the American Congress 
address the threat of terrorism is indicative of that body’s perceived threat level. This 
typical lack of Congressional consensus was notably diminished in the period 
immediately following the 9/11 attack. Instead, Republican and Democratic members of 
the House and Senate worked together to initiate security policies aimed at countering the 
terrorist threat. This bi-partisan cooperation is indicative of the deference theory, and 
strongly suggests that this component of the elite audience wholly accepted the 
securitizing move initiated by the executive.  
 
Congressional Response to 9/11 – The Relevance of the Deference Thesis 
The 9/11 attacks on the United States served to turn the Congressional agenda completely 
on its head. When members of Congress returned to Washington after Labor Day, they 
expected to resume debate on a long list of domestic issues including: campaign finance 
reform, a patient’s bill of rights, and Medicare reform, to name a few.59 Instead, the 
attack immediately shifted all discussion to the threat of terrorism and the government’s 
response to the threat. Domestic issues that once seemed pressing were put on hold as 
questions about homeland defense and security dominated the political agenda. The 
Congressional response to the 9/11 attacks demonstrates that members of the policy elite 
had accepted the securitizing move initiated by President Bush. The response of this 
group was indicative of the deference theory, which posits that, in times of crisis, 
members of the House and Senate should defer to the executive. Ultimately, an 
examination of the USA PATRIOT Act signals that members of the American policy 
elite accepted the securitizing move made by the authorized speaker of security, and 
opted to defer to the executive branch when legislating a response to the threat.  
 
The Congressional response to the attacks of September 11 demonstrates three indicators 
that the policy elite had accepted the securitizing move initiated by the executive. First, 
the threat was accepted by members of the House and Senate as the only issue warranting 
discussion in Congress. When Congress resumed following the summer break, the sole 
topic on the agenda was to address the threat of terrorism and to strengthen homeland 
security efforts. Members of Congress sought to address whether or not to authorize the 
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President to use military force against those responsible for the terrorist attacks and 
decided that a military show of force was necessary. Next, they considered whether or not 
to re-write state counter-terrorism laws and determined that these laws would have to be 
re-assessed. Finally, members of the House and Senate debated overhauling the whole 
process of airport security and decided that this too was an area where policy reform was 
necessary. In the days following the terrorist attacks on the United States, members felt 
an urgency to act quickly to address what had happened. Members of Congress worried 
that moving slowly might leave the United States and the American people vulnerable to 
future attacks. 60 This acceptance of the potential for future terrorist attacks as posing an 
existential threat to the state, resulted in the removal of all other topics from the political 
agenda. Counter-terrorism and homeland security were recognized as being the only 
topics worthy of consideration given the pervasive threat environment.  
 
The second indicator that the securitizing move had been accepted in the wake of the 
9/11 attacks, was that the issue of government financing for the various counter-terrorism 
measures being proposed was notably absent from discussion. While it was generally 
accepted that new measures be implemented immediately to address the threat of future 
attacks on the state, no one was asking about the price tag for all of these new initiatives. 
Lindsay notes that, “In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, the hottest topic during the 
summer of 2001 – how could Congress preserve the federal budget surplus? – 
disappeared from the political agenda.”61 There was a notion that the need to respond to 
the attacks and prevent future attacks was more important than balancing the federal 
budget. The enormity of what had happened out weighted any desire for fiscal constraint.  
 
Finally, bi-partisan cooperation between Republicans and Democrats increased as 
members of both parties sought to respond to the 9/11 terrorist threat. The clearest 
example of this bi-partisan cooperation took the form of the September 14 Authorization 
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) resolution authorizing President Bush to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those responsible for perpetrating the 9/11 attacks 
on the United States. The AUMF was passed into law by the Senate, without debate, in a 
roll call vote. This resolution provided that, “The President is authorized to use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent future 
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations, or 
persons.”62 The AUMF is an important example of the Republican-Democrat cooperation 
in the period following the 9/11 attacks because this resolution was a, “… broad grant of 
authority to use force against both nations and non-state actors. It focused on the use of 
force of those responsible for the attacks and as a means to prevent future attacks.”63 
Such a resolution, with serious implications for the future of American foreign policy, 
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would not have passed without debate if it was not generally accepted by members of 
Congress that the potential for future attacks warranted an immediate and wide-sweeping 
response.  
 
The U.S. Congress and the Deference Thesis 
The cooperation of Republicans and Democrats in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate can be explained by what Eric Posner has called the “Deference Thesis.” This 
thesis posits that, “… legislatures, courts, and other government institutions should defer 
to the executive’s policy decisions during national security emergencies.”64 This concept 
has evolved from the notion of colonial political defense, which held that deference to 
colonial authority in times of crisis constituted the central ingredient in colonial political 
ideology.65 In the American political system, events requiring a legislative response are 
filtered through a political process that is characterized by a lack of consensus among 
political elites.66 Crenshaw notes that, “… the decision-making process is disaggregated 
and pluralistic, and power is diffused.”67 Since it would be impossible for all issues to be 
dealt with simultaneously, political elites – the President, different agencies within the 
executive branch, Congress, the media, and ‘experts’ in academia as well as the 
consulting world – compete to set the national policy agenda. In normal times, that is, 
when the state does not see itself to be in imminent danger, the three branches of 
government (executive, legislative, and judicial) share power through a series of checks 
and balances. The President needs legislative approval in order to take action on a given 
issue. At the same time, the judicial branch reviews the policies set by the legislative 
branch and signed into law by the executive in order to ensure their conformity with pre-
existing legislation. Thus, while the President typically retains agenda-setting power, he 
depends on Congress to appropriate funds for the measures he proposes, and Congress 
can block issues or push forward others that the President has not chosen. According to 
the deference thesis, these checks and balances should disappear in times of crisis, 
granting the President exclusive power in legislating a response to the crisis.  
 
The deference thesis states that in times of imminent threat, both the legislative and 
judicial branches of government should defer to the executive. Posner explains that the 
thesis, “… assumes that the executive is controlled by the President, but to the extent that 
the President could be bound by agents within the executive, the deference thesis also 
holds that those agents should follow the President’s orders, not the other way around.”68 
Clearly, while the legislative and judicial branches of government are eager to assert their 
constitutional prerogatives in times of relative state security, the recognition of an 
existential threat to state security causes these branches of power to adopt a “rally ‘round 
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the flag” mentality that is marked by deference to executive authority. Ultimately, the 
change in Congressional/ Presidential relations precipitated by the 9/11 attacks was not 
unprecedented.  
 
A historical overview of power relations between the legislative and the executive 
branches of government throughout American history supports the deference thesis. In 
times of peace and security, Congress can be seen to defy executive authority in favor of 
more aggressive policy setting. In contrast, Congress will defer to presidential executive 
authority when there is a recognized, imminent threat to the state. Lindsay asserts that, 
“The pendulum of power on foreign policy has shifted back and forth between Congress 
and the President many times over the course of history.”69 In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, a time of relative security from external threats, Congress dominated 
the creation of foreign policy. Following the start of World War I, the executive branch 
regained its foreign policy supremacy; however, the end of the First World War saw this 
power returned to Congress as members of the House and Senate sought to avoid 
America’s involvement in what was viewed as “Europe’s problems.” The bombing of 
Pearl Harbor invalidated the isolationist tendencies of Congress and returned decision-
making authority to President Roosevelt. Following the Second World War, concerns 
over Soviet aggression saw more policymakers step to the sidelines on defense and 
foreign policy issues. This lead to the so-called “imperial presidency” of the 1960s, 
which saw members of Congress, “…stumbling over each other to see who can say ‘yea’ 
the quickest and the loudest.”70 The Cuban Missile Crisis stands out as perhaps the 
clearest example of the American Congress deferring to President Kennedy. This 
deference to presidential authority came to an end with souring public opinion about the 
Vietnam War.  
 
The deference thesis provides a useful tool for examining whether or not members of the 
policy elite have accepted an issue as posing an existential threat to the state. How 
aggressively Congress exercises its policy-making authority is a direct result of whether 
or not members of the House and Senate see the state as being threatened or is secure. 
This deference thesis has clear implications for the philosophical variant of securitization 
theory. If Congress, or the elite audience in general, acquiesces to the requests of the 
executive, those authorized speakers of security, then there is a high probability that the 
process of securitization has been initiated. An examination of the USA PATRIOT Act 
demonstrates Congressional deference to the President following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.  
 
The USA PATRIOT Act and Congressional Deference to Presidential 
Authorities 
The USA PATRIOT Act: An Overview 
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“USA PATRIOT Act” is a somewhat Orwellian acronym that stands for, “Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism.”71 This three hundred and forty-two page Act was drafted and passed 
by overwhelming majorities in both the House and Senate, and signed into law by 
President Bush on October 26, 2001 – just six weeks after the 9/11 attacks. This Act was 
enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 to demonstrate to the 
American public that the state was not entirely helpless against the terrorist threat. 
Gouvin explains that, “Bringing the terrorists ‘to justice’ would have been an excellent 
way to make that demonstration. Unfortunately, fighting the human combatants in a 
terrorist war is extremely difficult.”72 This Act gave the Secretary of the Treasury greater 
regulatory powers in order to address the potential for corruption of U.S. financial 
institutions for money laundering purposes. Further, it sought to prevent future terrorists 
from entering the United States and allowed for the detention and removal of those non-
citizens identified as posing a potential threat. The Act created new crimes, new 
penalties, and new procedural efficiencies for use against domestic and international 
would-be terrorists.73 Recognizing that intelligence collection and dissemination amongst 
governmental institutions would be important in attacking the threat of potential terrorist 
attacks, the USA PATRIOT Act gave federal officials and law enforcement personnel 
greater authority to track and intercept personal communications for intelligence 
gathering purposes.  
 
The USA PATRIOT ACT was predicated on an understanding that intelligence reform 
was an important component of the state’s counterterrorism strategy. Building on the 
Antiterrorism Act of 1996, enacted in the wake of the 1995 Oklahoma bombings, the 
USA PATRIOT Act sought to update standard intelligence procedures in order to 
increase their relevance in the information age.74 One of the functions of the Act was to 
“tear down walls” existing in the 1996 legislation that prevented the sharing of 
intelligence between different organizations and hindered inter-agency information 
sharing and coordination. There was general consensus, in Congress - that it was 
necessary to tear down the regulatory “walls” that prevented anti-terrorism intelligence 
agents and anti-terrorism criminal agents from sharing information. Heather McDonald, 
Senior Fellow at the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, explained in a Senate 
Committee hearing that these regulatory walls, “… were neither constitutionally nor 
statutorily mandated, but their effect was dire: they torpedoed what was probably the last 
chance to foil the 9/11 plot in August 2001.”75 In order to facilitate inter-agency 
                                                 
71
 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing the Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107 – 56 ξ 802, 115 stat/ 272, 376 (2001).  
72
 Eric J. Gouvin, “Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA PATRIOT Act, Money Laundering, and the War 
on Terrorism,” Baylor Law Review Vol. 55 (Fall 2003): 958. 
73
 Charles Doyle, CRS Report for Congress: Received Through the CRS Web. The USA PATRIOT Act: A 
Sketch. (Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress: April 18, 2002), 1. 
74
 For more information on the Antiterrorism Act of 1996 refer to Dempsey, James X. and David Cole, 
Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in the Name of National Security: Second 
Edition (New York: The New Press, 2006). 
75
 Prepared Statement of Heather McDonald. USA PATRIOT Act, “Hearing Before the Select Committee 
on Intelligence of the United States Senate One Hundred Ninth Congress First Session,” (April 19, 2005; 
April 27, 2005; May 24, 2005) Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence. U.S. 
Government Printing Office Washington: 2006b, available at: http://www.acess.gpo.gov/congress/senate. 
McGuire: Legislating Against the Threat: The U.S. and Canadian Policy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
242 
 
intelligence collaboration, Section 203 of the Act permits unprecedented sharing of 
sensitive information sources across several independent agencies, including the FBI, 
CIA, INS, and other state and federal organizations. Section 214 of the Act increased the 
power of the FBI to allow it to access both criminal and foreign intelligence cases so long 
as a judge ruled that the information would be ‘relevant’ to an on-going investigation. 
Perhaps more shockingly, Section 215 of the Act changed the law surrounding record 
checks so that third party holders of financial, library, travel, video rental, phone, 
medical, church, synagogue, and mosque records can be searched without the knowledge 
or consent of the target.76 It seems clear that, with these reforms to intelligence collection 
and data sharing, Congress was willing to sacrifice concerns over personal privacy in 
favor of enhanced national security. 
 
Under the pretense of enhancing national security and reforming intelligence collection 
as well as inter-agency cooperation, the USA PATRIOT Act increased the power of the 
executive branch of government, while decreasing judicial oversight. Examples of this 
enhanced executive power include Section 802 of the Act, which created a new crime – 
“domestic terrorism” – that includes any dangerous acts that, “… appear to be intended… 
to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion.”77 Section 411 of the 
Act diminishes the right to due process for immigrants by expanding the term, “engage in 
terrorist activity” to include any use of a weapon, as well as non-violent acts of 
fundraising for “suspect” organizations.78 Section 215 of the Act redefines the standards 
of probable cause as outlined in the Fourth Amendment. All of these sections of the Act 
increased federal powers in the name of enhanced national security.  
 
While the USA PATRIOT Act was heralded as a comprehensive legislative response to 
the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period, there were serious criticisms leveled 
against this piece of legislation following its enactment. The primary concern over the 
Act stemmed from its potential to violate citizens’ Fourth Amendment rights. The most 
controversial measures of the Act involved information sharing from criminal 
investigations among the FBI and other intelligence agencies. The use of roving wiretaps 
across multiple communication devices, which facilitated government access to business 
records, and “sneak and peek” search warrants that allowed the authorities to search 
homes and businesses without prior notice were also considered to be questionable 
violations of civil liberties.79 In reviewing terms of the Act set to expire as a result of the 
2005 sunset clause, Representative Bob Barr noted that, “When Congress created foreign 
intelligence roving wiretap authority in the USA PATRIOT Act, it failed to include the 
checks against abuse present in the analogous criminal statute. This is troubling because, 
as roving wiretaps attach to the target of the surveillance and not to the individual 
communications device, they provide a far more extensive and intrusive record of a 
                                                 
76
 Jill Hills, “What’s New? War, Censorship, and Global Transmission,” The International Communication 
Gazette 68:3 (2006): 206.  
77
 USA PATRIOT Act 
78
 Lisa Funnegan Abdolian and Harold Takooshian, “The USA PATRIOT Act: Civil Liberties, the Media, 
and Public Opinion,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 30:4 (2001): 1431.  
79
 Congressional Digest, “Civil Liberties in Times of War: 2005 – 2006 Policy Debate Topic,” (September 
2005): 193.  
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 5
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol6/iss5/26
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.6.3S.24
243 
 
person’s communications.”80 The concerns over provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act 
were ultimately overlooked by Congress in favor of a speedy legislative response to the 
events of 9/11.  
 
The Deference Thesis and the USA PATRIOT Act 
In keeping with the principles of the deference thesis, Congress can be seen to have 
acquiesced to the demands of the executive with regards to the terms of the USA 
PATRIOT Act. This deference to the executive branch is most evident in the strong 
bilateral cooperation between Republicans and Democrats in passing the Act. The Act 
was passed by large majorities in both the Senate (98-1) and the House (357-66) without 
public hearings or debate.81 The fact that only one Senator, Russell Feingold of 
Wisconsin, and only sixty-six members of the House voted against the Act speak to 
Congress’ commitment to passing this piece of legislation quickly.82 Despite concerns 
about the potential for governmental abuse of power and a loss of personal privacy, both 
Republican and Democratic representatives agreed to a ‘sunset clause’ that required over 
a dozen provisions in the Act to expire on December 31, 2005 pending Congressional 
renewal. Representatives were willing to endorse the Act in spite of its similarities to the 
Antiterrorism Act of 1996, which had already been ruled partially unconstitutional by 
federal courts.83  
 
The USA PATRIOT Act was enacted with minimal Congressional deliberation. Covering 
three hundred and fifty different subject areas, as well as forty different agencies; this Act 
was the largest piece of anti-terrorism legislation ever tabled in the United States. While 
issues are generally debated for months before being put to a vote, the USA PATRIOT 
Act was pushed through Congress in less than a month. In order to speed up the 
implementation of this Act, members of both the House and Senate agreed that the law 
should be, “… hammered out in private negotiations between the Justice Department and 
party leaders.”84 As a result, there were no final hearings to allow dissenters to voice their 
concerns and no committee reports on the implications of the legislation. Shockingly, 
many members of Congress were so eager to demonstrate their willingness to cooperate 
that they did not take the time to read all three hundred and forty-two pages of the Act.85 
The bipartisan cooperation in passing the USA PATRIOT Act was a testament to the 
desire of Congress to enact legislation quickly in response to the terrorist attacks. The 
bipartisan cooperation of members of the American policy elite is indicative of this 
group’s acceptance of the securitizing move made by President Bush.  
 
The willingness of House and Senate Republicans and Democrats to cooperate in passing 
the USA PATRIOT Act was compounded by their shared belief in the importance of 
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enacting immediate legislation dealing with the threat of terrorism. This need to respond 
to the crisis as quickly as possible is what fueled Congressional acceptance for the ‘sunset 
clause’ contained in the Act. There was agreement that it was better to enact the 
legislation immediately, and worry about the sixteen questionable provisions of the Act 
as well as the “lone wolf” amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act when 
they expired in 2005.  
 
Statements made by members of the policy elite at the 2005 Select Committee on 
Intelligence of the United States Senate hearing on the renewal of provisions of the USA 
PATRIOT Act demonstrate the commitment of members of Congress to passing this 
legislation. Bob Barr, Georgia’s Seventh District Representative in the U.S. House of 
Representatives from 1995 to 2003 noted that, “Even though I voted for the USA 
PATRIOT Act in October 2001, as did many of my colleagues, I did so with the 
understanding that it was an extraordinary measure for an extraordinary threat; that it 
would be used exclusively, or at least primarily, in the context of important antiterrorism 
cases; and that the Department of Justice would be cautious in its implementation and 
forthcoming in providing information on its use to the Congress and the American 
people.”86 John D. Rockefeller III, Vice Chairman of the committee similarly remarked 
that,  
 
“There were good reasons to act quickly after the September 11 attacks. Because of the 
need for speed then it was wise to require, through a sunset provision, that there be a 
further evaluation of portions of the Act after several years of experience.”87 
James X. Dempsey, Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, 
also echoed this sentiment about the need to act quickly to legislate against the threat of 
terrorism, noting that, “In 2001, in response to some legitimate complaints of the 
Administration that the prior rules for counterterrorism investigations were unreasonable 
or were out of date or ill-suited to the threat of terrorism, Congress adopted the 
PATRIOT ACT… In the anxiety of those weeks after 9/11, Congress eliminated the old 
rules…”88 
 
These statements, made by various members of the U.S. policy elite, are evidence of the 
perceived need by Congress to act quickly to demonstrate to the public that the 
government was taking seriously the renewed threat of terrorism. Members of the House 
and Senate were willing to defer authority to the executive – President Bush – so as to 
expedite this process.   
 
The Canadian Policy Elite in the Post-9/11 Period 
Canada’s Past Encounters with Terrorism 
Contrary to reports made by the American media following the attacks on that state, 
Canada had not been immune to terrorist attacks prior to 9/11. The response of Canadian 
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policymakers to the September 11 attacks on the United States borrowed heavily from 
lessons learned by dealing with both the FLQ crisis in 1970, and the Air India bombing in 
1985. These two past encounters with terrorist actors became part of the bureaucratic 
institutional memory, and Canadian policymakers drew on these events when shaping 
their policy response to the American tragedy. Discussions with Canadian policymakers 
responsible for drafting the state’s policy response to the 9/11 attacks universally 
emphasized the importance of understanding Canada’s previous experiences with 
terrorism in order to appreciate the evolution of this country’s counter-terrorism policies.  
 
1963- 1968: The FLQ and the October Crisis 
Between 1963 and 1973, The Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) sought to establish an 
autonomous French state of Quebec that would operate independently of the rest of 
Canada. The FLQ established connections with Algeria and Cuba and even sent members 
of its organization to the Middle East to train at Palestinian resistance camps.89 From 
1963 until 1968, the group’s mandate was based on traditional nationalistic sentiment, 
and its main demand was the separation of the province of Quebec from the rest of 
Canada.90 During this period, the organization employed demand-terrorism techniques 
and perpetuated small bomb attacks in order to get media attention. By late 1968, the 
FLQ evolved from demand-like tactics to revolutionary terror, and became increasingly 
violent. These revolutionary tactics began in January of 1969 when a bomb exploded near 
the home of the Montreal police chief. In February of that year, a bomb at the Montreal 
Stock Exchange seriously injured thirty people. On June 24, 1970 – the National Day Of 
French Canadians (St. Jean Baptiste Day) – one person was killed when FLQ operatives 
set off a bomb at National Defense Headquarters in Ottawa.91 This escalation in attacks 
culminated in the October 5, 1970 kidnapping of British diplomat, James Cross at the 
consulate in Montreal by one cell of the FLQ, and the kidnapping and execution of 
Quebec Cabinet Minister, Pierre Laporte, by another cell. These kidnappings and the 
subsequent response of the federal government to these actions came to be known as the 
October Crisis, and marked the first time that the Canadian federal government had to 
deal directly with terrorism in Canada.  
 
In response to the October Crisis, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau proclaimed the 
“War Measures Act” to be in effect at four o’clock in the morning on October 16, 1970. 
The next day, Minister Laporte was found strangled to death, his body located at St. 
Hubert Airport after midnight on October 18. The following day, the House of Commons 
passed a motion supporting the government’s introduction of the War Measures Act. This 
Act, originally introduced in 1914 before the beginning of the First World War, was 
adopted to, “… protect national security and to prepare for the conditions of war.”92 The 
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Act was applicable to the October Crisis under its “Public Order Emergency” clause, 
which stipulated that, “Where the Governor in Council believes that a public order 
emergency exists in Canada, he or she could, on reasonable grounds, after consultation 
with the Lieutenant Governor in Council of the province or provinces in question, issue a 
proclamation declaring this to be the case. If the public order emergency exists in only 
one province, such a declaration should issue only if the Lieutenant Governor in Council 
is in agreement (ss. 17(1) and 25)”93 
 
The War Measures Act greatly enhanced the authoritative power of the state, and allowed 
for the arrest and detention of anyone suspected of being involved in the FLQ attacks. 
However, this Act did not define what was meant by “terrorism” in the context of the 
Canadian state. Instead, the FLQ and other groups that advocated the use of force or the 
commission of crime as a means of accomplishing governmental change within Canada 
were declared “unlawful associations.”94 While the War Measures Act served to 
effectively end the FLQ crisis, it did not establish a permanent Canadian response to 
episodes of domestic terrorism. 
 
1985: The Bombing of Air India Flight 182 
Canada once again experienced domestic terrorism with the 1985 bombing of Air India 
Flight 182 aboard the “Kanishka”, which killed all three hundred and twenty-nine 
passengers on board, two hundred and eighty of whom were Canadian citizens95. This 
attack was the work of members of the Sikh militant group, Babbar Khalsa, which had a 
network of operatives in Canada. Although Canadian intelligence assets had knowledge 
of a plot to plant a bomb on an Air India flight originating in Canada, a lack of 
organizational coordination, and the absence of legislation clearly delineating the 
parameters of a domestic terrorist attack, meant that this tragedy went largely unstudied 
until 2006. Following a (largely unsuccessful) trial of those deemed responsible for the 
bombing, the Canadian government called the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. The Commission’s final report, 
“Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy” recognized that Canada’s past experiences 
with domestic terrorism are an “… important opportunity to learn from the past to better 
secure our future.”96 It is important to note that Canada was directly affected by the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States, but not in the same way as its southern neighbor. 
Twenty-six Canadians were killed in the attacks on September 11, 2001. While Canadian 
citizens were killed by the attacks on the United States, the fact that these attacks did not 
take place on Canadian soil did not prompt the government to see the events of 9/11 as a 
direct attack on Canada. Drawing on past experiences with domestic terrorism, Canadian 
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policymakers took a cautious approach to developing legislation aimed at combating the 
threat posed by the potential for future terrorist attacks in North America.  
 
Consultation with members of the policy elite from CSIS, the Department of National 
Defense, Public Safety, and the Canadian Revenue Agency all asserted how discussions 
of the Air India bombing led to the development of a Canadian definition for 
“terrorism.”97 Members of the policy elite noted that they drew on Canada’s experiences 
with domestic terrorism when involved in drafting counter-terrorism policies for Canada 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on the United States. There was general consensus that the 
Canadian response should demonstrate an evolution in Canadian law and policies that 
reflects lessons learned from past failures in addressing acts of domestic terrorism. These 
members of the policy elite sought to draw on Canada’s bureaucratic memory in order to 
avoid repeating mistakes of the past with regards to evidence reporting and clearly 
delineating the legal boundaries of “terrorist offences.” These lessons culminated in the 
creation of Bill C-36, more commonly referred to as the “Anti-Terrorism Act.”  
 
Bill C-36, Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act  
Like its southern neighbor, Canada sought to counter the threat of terrorism by enacting 
legislation that rendered acts of “terrorism” illegal, and provided the means of 
prosecuting those engaged in planning or carrying out terrorist activities against the state. 
The Canadian government introduced Bill C-36, The Anti-Terrorism Act, in response to 
calls to action from both the United States and the United Nations. An examination of 
Bill C-36 reveals more evidence of policy diffusion than of policy convergence when 
comparing the Canadian legislation to its American counterpart, the USA PATRIOT Act. 
This policy diffusion is the result of intense debate amongst members of the Canadian 
policy elite over the terms and conditions of the Canadian legislation. The Anti-Terrorism 
Act faced opposition from both members of Parliament and the Senate, and also from 
members of civil society groups. The debate arising from this opposition led to 
amendments of the legislation so as to balance the perceived need for counter-terrorism 
legislation with protecting so-called “Canadian values” enshrined in the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. Ultimately, the compromise surrounding the enactment of Bill C-36 
demonstrates that the response of members of the Canadian policy elite was not 
consistent with the process of securitization. In contrast to the USA PATRIOT Act, Bill 
C-36 was not a catchall response to counter-terrorism. This legislation was merely the 
first in a series of Acts aimed at addressing homeland security and counter-terrorism in 
Canada, and was followed almost immediately by the Public Safety Act. Instead of the 
deference to elite authority shown by the American policy elite to the executive branch of 
government, members of the Canadian policy elite can be seen to have consented to 
pressures from the U.S. and the United Nations to legislate against the threat of terrorism. 
In Canada, the threat of terrorism did not supersede the realm of tradition politics so as to 
become securitized. Instead, counter-terrorism legislation was debated alongside other 
issues relevant to the Canadian polity at that time.  
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Canada’s Legislative Response to Terrorism: Convergence and Diffusion 
from the American Model 
Media commentators commonly refer to Bill C-36, The Anti-terrorism Act as “Canada’s 
PATRIOT Act.” This false comparison led to is an overestimation of the similarities 
between the two pieces of legislation. Critics, such as the former head of CSIS, Reid 
Morden, charged that, “… the anti-terrorist legislative changes brought before Parliament 
were largely the result of pressures to keep up with the neighbors.”98 While it is true that 
“…Canada moved swiftly to change its legislation to reflect the new U.S. priorities…”99, 
the response of members of the policy elite in Canada was markedly different from 
American attempts to “legislate away the threat.” Canada’s legislative response to 
counter-terrorism was precipitated by a section in the USA PATRIOT Act entitled, 
“Protecting the Northern Border” which singled out the U.S.’s shared border with Canada 
as a potential soft target for would-be terrorists seeking to gain entry into the United 
States. This American fear was predicated on the notion that, as primary targets are 
hardened by enhanced security measures, terrorists would seek out softer targets in other 
countries.  
  
Canada’s desire to respond to American concerns about counter-terrorism policy in this 
state served two purposes. First, discussions with members of the Canadian policy elite, 
particularly those engaged in intelligence collection and dissemination, recognized that 
there was the potential for al-Qaeda, or an “AQ-like” non-state organization to carry out 
an attack on Canadian soil following the 9/11 attack on the United States.100 Reg 
Whitaker expresses this concern, noting, “As a liberal, capitalist, ‘infidel’ democracy 
allied closely to the United States, Canada is obviously implicated as a target of radical 
Islamist terror. The apparently authentic statement issued by Osama bin Laden in the fall 
of 2002 specifically threatened Canada along with other Western states associated with 
the United States.” 101 
 
Intelligence collected by NATO forces in Afghanistan following the attacks on the 
United States listed other Western states that al-Qaeda sought to “punish” for their close 
relationships with the United States. Canada was included in this list. Further, members 
of the Canadian policy elite, on advisement from the Department of National Defense, 
recognized that Canada’s legislative and administrative response to the potential for 
biological or nuclear attacks as well as the state’s emergency preparedness quotient 
lagged behind those of the United States and its Department of Homeland Security.  
 
The second purpose of Canada’s legislative response to counter-terrorism was the 
recognition by members of the policy elite, of the state’s need to limit the collateral 
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economic harm to the Canadian economy that would result from an American loss of 
confidence in Canadian security measures. There was unspoken consensus that U.S. 
homeland security would be protected either at the Canada-U.S. border or around a wider 
North American perimeter. If security were imposed along the Canada-U.S. border by the 
United States, it would come at an economic cost unacceptable to Canada, which sends 
more than 85 percent of its exports to the United States. A closing of the northern 
American border would decimate Canadian industry, which employs a just-in-time trade 
model of shipping goods to the United States. Several Canadian counter-terrorism 
policies were adopted by members of the policy elite out of the necessity of complying 
with pre-existing American policies. For example, Canada’s Anti-terrorism Act included 
policies relating to federal aviation regulations, which were in direct response to the 
American policy of demanding advance production of a range of personal data on 
passengers arriving from abroad at U.S. airports. Whitaker explains that, “Canada had no 
choice in this matter, short of losing landing rights for Canadian carriers, even though this 
American policy did necessitate overriding Canadian privacy law.”102 While some policy 
convergence between the USA PATRIOT Act and the Canadian Anti-terrorism Act can 
be identified, often this convergence is the result of understanding by members of the 
Canadian policy elite that certain policies would have to be adopted in order to secure 
Canadian economic interests. In other areas, analysis of the Anti-terrorism Act discloses 
little that can be seen as directly responding to American demands, as such, or reflecting 
American provisions and practices. There was recognition that, “Canadian public opinion 
demands distance from the appearance that Canadian policy is being dictated from 
Washington. This latter tendency is heightened when the U.S. leadership is perceived by 
many in Canada as immoderate and potentially dangerous….”103 Canada’s counter-
terrorism legislation has much more in common with British and Australian policies.  
 
Responding to the UN: Canada’s Counter-terrorism Legislative Response 
In addition to responding to American concerns about Canadian security legislation, the 
federal government and members of the Canadian policy elite sought to respond to the 
United Nations’ resolutions calling for member states to enact counter-terrorism 
legislation. Most relevant for Canada was UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which 
stipulated that, “… all states should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as 
well as criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds for such acts. The funds, 
financial assets, and economic resources of those who commit or attempt to commit 
terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts and of persons 
and entities acting on behalf of terrorists should also be frozen without delay.”104 
 
The Resolution further stated that member states would be expected to, “… prevent those 
who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts from using their respective 
territories for those purposes against other countries and their citizens. States should also 
ensure that anyone who has participated in the financing, planning, preparation, or 
perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice. They 
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should also ensure that terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offences in 
domestic laws and regulations and that the seriousness of such acts is duly reflected in 
sentences served.”105 
 
The Canadian government took the position that this UN Resolution required that Bill C-
36 become law by December 18, 2001, in time for Canada to report to the new United 
Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee. UN Security Council binding Resolution 1373 
called on all states under the mandatory provisions of chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter to ensure that terrorism was treated as a serious crime, but it did not attempt to 
define terrorism.106 The necessity of defining terrorism before legislating against this 
threat resulted in Bill C-36, The Anti-terrorism Act, which was closer in nature to 
legislation passed by Britain and Australia than to that of the United States.  
 
Bill C-36: The Anti-Terrorism Act 
Canada’s attempt to satisfy both American and United Nations’ expectations regarding 
counter-terrorism legislation resulted in Bill C-36, The Anti-Terrorism Act, which was 
introduced in the House of Commons on October 15, 2001. Bill C-36 had four central 
objectives: (1) to stop terrorists from entering Canada and to protect citizens from future 
terrorists attacks, (2) to design and implement tools aimed at identifying, prosecuting, 
convicting, and punishing would-be terrorists, (3) to prevent would-be terrorists from 
affecting Canada-U.S. cross border relations and negatively affecting the Canadian 
economy, and, finally, (4) to work with the international community to bring terrorists to 
justice and to address the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.107 One of the most 
important facets of this Act was its creation of a Canadian definition of terrorism. This 
Act enabled the Cabinet, “… to designate groups as ‘terrorist’ with only a limited 
possibility of judicial review of its decision, created a range of new offences, expanded 
police powers, and provided for preventive arrest.”108 Bill C-36 was produced with record 
speed. According to Kent Roach, its main sections, “… were drafted between September 
11 and October 13, with the crucial definition of terrorism discussed up until the last 
minute before the bill was introduced in Parliament.”109 Following a truncated debate 
after the third reading of the bill, the Anti-terrorism Act was passed on November 29, 
2001, by a vote of 189 in favor to 47 opposed, and was later approved without 
amendments by the Senate.110 Bill C-36 was proclaimed to be in force on December 24, 
2001, in time to be included in Canada’s report to the United Nations on the state’s 
compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373.  
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Bill C-36: The Product of Intense Debate 
The Absence of the Deference Thesis and the Relevance of Debate 
Canadian policymakers did not show the deference to the executive demonstrated by 
American policy makers and members of the policy elite to the American President. 
Instead, the resulting legislation was the product of intense debate between members of 
Parliament and the Senate, and members of interested civil society groups. This debate, 
and the lack of deference to the executive branch of government, further demonstrates the 
absence of securitization in Canada. The philosophical variant of securitization theory 
can be seen as constituting a continuum. First, an authorized speaker of security 
articulates a threat as posing an existential and imminent danger to the state. Second, the 
elite audience either accepts of rejects this threat and transmits its opinion to the populist 
audience, who must then accept or reject the threat articulation in their own right. The 
creation of a feedback loop allowing for the inclusion of policy debate and public insight 
into the creation of a given security policy demonstrates that there has been no attempt to 
securitize the policy issue. In this way, recognition of the deference thesis has important 
implications for determining whether or not the audience must accept or reject a given 
threat as posing an existential risk to the state. While members of the American policy 
elite accepted that the threat of terrorism in the post-9/11 period posed an imminent 
danger to citizens of the state and thus deferred to the President in crafting a legislative 
response to that threat, this was not the case in Canada. Members of the Canadian policy 
elite expressed dissent at the executive’s vision for the state’s counter-terrorism policy. 
Canadian policymakers actively debated various facets of the legislation and sought to 
amend aspects of Bill C-36 that did not serve their vision of the “Canadian interest.” In 
addition to Parliamentary and Senate debates over the Bill, the opinions of members of 
various civil society groups were also considered. The acceptance and inclusion of public 
opinion into the policy making process further demonstrates a lack of securitization. 
Instead of transmitting an “official view” of a threat to the audience, the executive and 
the elite audience welcomed public input into crafting the state’s legislative response.  
 
Bill C-36: Debate and Dissent Within the Government 
Within the Canadian government, there was important opposition to sections of Bill C-
36, The Anti-Terrorism Act. Various governmental actors, including the Privacy 
Commissioner, the Information Commissioner, and the Canadian Human Rights 
Commissioner all voiced concerns about terms contained in the bill. An overview of 
these concerns demonstrates the lack of executive deference. George Radwanski, then 
Canadian Privacy Commissioner, expressed his strong concerns about the preemption of 
privacy legislation once the Attorney General issued a certificate prohibiting access to 
information to protect national security, national defense, or international relations.111 
Likewise, Liberal backbencher and noted human rights lawyer, Irwin Cotler publicly 
opposed Bill C-36, and identified what he determined to be eleven ‘deficiencies’ with the 
legislation. These included, “…over breadth in the bill’s definition of terrorism, the lack 
of prior notice to a group listed as a terrorist group, concerns about access to information 
and the right to privacy, the need to sunset provisions for preventive arrests and 
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investigative hearings, the need for charities to have a due diligence defense if their 
charitable status was revoked, and the need for more oversight mechanisms, such as a 
parliamentary officer to monitor and supervise the legislation.”112 
 
Concerns about the legislation resulted in uncharacteristic breaches in Cabinet solidarity 
pertaining to support of the bill. For example, Liberal Fisheries Minister, Herb Dhaliwal 
noted that, “Civil liberties are extremely important to Canadians… certainly as someone 
from the ethnic community and a visible minority this is something extremely important 
to me.”113 
 
The Anti-terrorism Act was hotly debated in various governmental committees following 
its introduction in the House. One of these committees, the Special Senate Committee on 
Bill C-36 issued an important bi-partisan report on November 1, 2001, which reflected 
both the Liberal majority and Conservative minority Senate position on the bill. This 
report called for extensive revisions to Bill C-36 including: changes to the definition of 
terrorism, enactment of a non-discrimination clause, the appointment of an officer of 
Parliament to monitor the implementation of the bill, reporting requirements on actions 
taken under the bill, and judicial review of time restrictions on security certificates to 
protect information from disclosure. The report also called for a five-year sunset clause 
that would force the reintroduction of the bill in the future.114 The bi-partisan findings of 
this special committee demonstrate the opinion of the policy elite, that Canada’s 
legislative response to counter-terrorism must be balanced with its citizens’ Charter 
rights.  
 
Bill C-36: Opposition from Civil Society Groups 
Governmental debate over the provisions of Bill C-36 was mirrored by debates that took 
place within civil society groups about the legislation. Of primary concern was that the 
original wording of the bill would have equated illegal strikes and anti-globalization 
protests as ‘terrorist’ acts.115 Much like the governmental critics of the legislation, civil 
society groups expressed trepidations over some of the powers and controls outlined in 
the act. They were especially concerned about, “… the power to detain a suspect without 
charge, with judicial approval, for 72 hours to a year if the person did not agree to 
reasonable restrictions on his or her behavior as a condition of release; the possibility of 
up to ten years imprisonment for ‘legally participating or contributing’ to the activities of 
a known terrorist group; the requirement to testify at ‘investigative hearings’; and the 
new power given to the Solicitor General to create a list of terrorists on ‘reasonable 
grounds’ without any requirement to notify individuals or groups that they were on the 
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list.”116 Representatives from various groups spoke out about their concerns that Bill C-
36 would unnecessarily infringe on the civil liberties of Canadian citizens.  
 
The Anti-terrorism Act drew criticism from a wide array of civil society groups 
including: those representing Aboriginal peoples, unions, charities, refugees, lawyers, and 
watchdog review agencies. A sampling of some of the statements made by these groups 
demonstrates the diverse input that influenced the development of Bill C-36. These civil 
society groups addressed issues such as the definition of terrorist activities, and 
recommended that an exemption from the definition for strikes and protests not be 
limited to lawful protests and strikes. The result of the criticism from these groups has 
been described as, “… the most balanced example of legislative activism to date, and one 
that demonstrated the ability of Parliament to take rights considerations into account.”117 
These civil society groups were able to put a human face on those individuals who might 
be harmed by the broad definitions contained in first drafts of the bill. Civil rights lawyer, 
Alan Borovoy, the head of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, presented his 
concerns to parliamentary groups and to the media arguing that, “… the bill should 
require a judicial warrant before it authorized either the secret recordings of Canadians 
speaking with people in other countries or the declaration of a group or an individual as a 
terrorist.”118 Likewise, Eric Rice, the President of the Canadian Bar Association, 
following consultations with more than two hundred lawyers affiliated with his group, 
raised concerns about, “investigative hearings, broad terrorism offences, and mandatory 
sentencing provisions that would undermine the operation of the justice system.”119 These 
criticisms of the bill founded on legal grounds were accompanied by a host of concerns 
from other groups in society. 
 
Various religious and ethnic groups issued statements to the media and made 
presentations before parliamentary groups expressing their concerns about the proposed 
legislation. For example, a representative of the Canadian Council of Churches and 
Catholic Bishops argued that the bill would negatively impact on charities. He noted that, 
of these charities, “… nearly one half of which are religious organizations… the section 
(of Bill C-36) could catch church groups that in good faith, and after due diligence, 
provide funds to their overseas partners for humanitarian or development assistance.”120 
Representatives of the National Jewish Congress of Canada and the Canadian Buddhist 
Association echoed his sentiments.121 Speaking at a Special Senate Committee meeting, a 
representative of the Canadian Arab Federation expressed concerns that Bill C-36, 
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combined with other legal initiatives, “… was an attempt to stifle the current evolution of 
human rights culture among the general population…”122 Similarly, speaking before the 
Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, Grand Chief Matthew Coon Come of 
the Assembly of First Nations argued that the proposed legislation would lead to a 
proliferation of events such as the killing of Dudley George at Ipperwash. In his 
presentation, he sought to, “… demonstrate the risk posed to First Nations by legislation 
that gives heightened powers to police, narrows the civil rights of those involved in 
legitimate dissent and protest activities and limits or suspends the civil rights of those 
perceived by the government to be involved in ‘terrorist’ activities.”123 
 
Relevance of Debate Over Bill C-36 
Ultimately, members of the policy elite had to amend aspects of the Anti-terrorism Act so 
as to address concerns raised by members of Parliament and the Senate, and by civil 
society groups. These amendments were significant because they indicated that the policy 
elite were conscientious of public opinion, and were more concerned with ensuring that 
the public would accept the terms of the final legislation. The allowance of dissenting 
opinions regarding the original draft of the bill signified the absence of the securitization 
process. While those who opposed the USA PATRIOT Act in the United States were 
made to feel that they were some how contradicting what was in the best interest of that 
state, Roach notes that, “critics of Bill C-36 were generally not made to feel that they 
were being disloyal or unpatriotic.”124 Ultimately, the Anti-terrorism Act was amended to 
include a ‘sunset’ provision on preventative arrest and investigative hearings, a new 
provision requiring the federal Attorney General and Solicitor General and their 
provincial equivalents to report annually to Parliament on any use of preventative arrest 
or investigative hearings, and, a separate interpretive clause for greater clarity regarding 
the protection of political, religious, or ideological beliefs and expressions.125 Members 
of the policy elite responded to the concerns of critics of the legislation and amended the 
bill accordingly.  
 
While Bill C-36 was ultimately passed by the government invoking closure, which 
limited Parliament to two days of debate when the bill was reported back after the third 
reading, the amendments made to the final draft of the act took into account the criticisms 
presented by different groups. The invocation of closure was not intended to stifle the 
input of civil society groups, but rather to allow the government to meet the deadline set 
by the UN Security Council for reporting on counter-terrorism legislation. The Minister 
of Justice, Anne McLellan, defended closure noting that, “our allies around the world are 
moving and it would be irresponsible for us, as a government, not to move.”126 Forcing 
closure indicates that the policy elite was more concerned with protecting Canadian 
interests by keeping our allies satisfied than with convincing every member of the public 
that terrorism posed an imminent threat to the state.  
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The Other Half of the Elite Audience  
The members of the policy elite are only half of the elite audience group. While this 
group is the first to interact with the authorized speakers of security, they also collaborate 
with the second component of the elite audience – the media. The media reports on the 
policies and institutions created by the policy elite. In this way, the media translates the 
policy elite audience’s response to the articulation of a given threat to the populist 
audience. The role played by the media in framing and shaping public opinion of distant 
events points to the importance of considering the relevance of media frames in the 
process of securitizing a given issue.  
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